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A B S T R A C T   
Input and output measures, including the use of (Pigou) taxes, have been recommended to bridge the gap be-
tween average and marginal revenues in fisheries. Several countries have improved management, but few have 
followed the fiscal recommendations. On the contrary, subsidies that can expand capacity and effort have been 
and still are used. For decades, international organizations such as the WTO, FAO, and OECD have discussed 
subsidy issues. In the case of Norway, annual support negotiations between government and industry were 
institutionalised in 1964. The support increased throughout the 1970s, and at its peak in 1980 support amounted 
to about 40% of the gross value of all catches. Bjørn S. Brochmann was a chief economist in the Ministry of 
Fisheries. During a leave of absence in 1979–80 he wrote a report, and in 1981 he published a journal article 
discussing long-term effects of government support to fisheries. Based on the Gordon-Schaefer model, he 
demonstrated that revenue-augmenting and cost-reducing support could not solve the poor income problem of 
fisheries. Rather, subsidies will work in the opposite direction, creating even greater need for future support. His 
reports, conference talks, and media interviews created havoc in fishing communities and organizations. This 
paper places Brochmann’s work in a national and international context and discusses its influence on Norwegian 
fisheries policy. A translated version of Brochmann’s article (1981) is included in this paper, as a reference guide 
for subsidy-reliant countries and as a tribute to the history of the political economy of fisheries.   
1. Introduction 
To date, fisheries economists have mainly been concerned with ef-
ficiency issues in fisheries management: first, in the seminal article of H. 
S. Gordon [21]. and, of course, in the work of Jens Warming from 
Ref. [46] – this was written in Danish and an English translation was 
published by Ref. [1]. Gordon discussed what would happen in the case 
of unregulated open-access fisheries and outlined possible remedies to 
increase the social benefits. Warming did the same, suggesting the 
possible use of a (Pigou) tax to bridge the gap between average and 
marginal revenues at the optimal level of fishing effort, thus preceding 
A.C. Pigou [11,35]. Throughout the 20th century, several papers have 
expanded the work of [21]; including works by [8,9,23,39]; and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [33]. In one 
way or another, these publications have confirmed the need to limit 
fishing efforts or harvests in order for societies to reap the benefits of 
rich fish resources. However, few countries adhered to such 
recommendations – at least not until after the development of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the 1970s which made it 
possible to establish 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs [7]; to 
manage their own resources. 
Contrary to economists’ recommendations about restricting entry to 
and efforts towards fish harvesting – either by command and control, 
quota markets, or fees and taxes – several countries acted in the opposite 
direction by economically supporting the expansion of their fishing 
fleets and efforts [28,29,33,38]. In Norway, a major fish harvesting and 
exporting country, government support was institutionalised from the 
mid-1960s, and the monetary value increased – with some ups and 
downs – until it peaked in 1980. The following year, support started to 
decrease and, by the mid-1990s, it was almost entirely gone. This article 
briefly discusses the rise and decline of Norwegian fishery subsidies, 
together with a discussion about work relating to government support of 
fisheries in some major international organizations. Most importantly, 
we present a translation of an influential article on the ‘Long-term effects 
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of government support to the fisheries’, written and published in19811 
in Norwegian by Bjørn S. Brochmann, then a chief economist in the 
Ministry of Fisheries. 
2. The rise and decline of fishery subsidies in Norway 
2Norway has a long history of government support of the fishing 
industry, including construction of harbors, trade and export regulation, 
as well as modernized communication, investment loans for new vessels 
and processing plants, lighthouses and rescue ships, social security 
measures and social services [26]. Simultaneously, the fishing industry 
has paid taxes, both on export and harvest values. One of these, “tiend” 
(the ten per cent) in the 19th century, may be seen as an early form of 
resource tax, even though its main objective was to benefit the gov-
ernment purse, including the king and the church, and not to conserve 
natural resources. 
During the 1950s, a major part of the government support of fisheries 
was given as price support of raw fish, through the fishermen’s sales 
organizations, which were established by law to manage the first-hand 
trade of fish. In addition, other organizations were involved. Early in 
the 1960s, the government found it too troublesome to negotiate with 
several organizations and, in 1964, established a general agreement 
between the government and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Federation 
(NFF). According to this agreement, the NFF could ask for annual ne-
gotiations regarding support if they found that income in the fishing 
industry fell behind that of other industries. The NFF negotiated on 
behalf of the whole industry, including inshore and offshore fishermen 
and vessels, harvest and processing, and trade and export firms, and 
cooperated with the other organizations in developing the annual claim 
for support and during the negotiations. These arrangements made the 
NFF into a strong and leading organization within the Norwegian 
institutional system. Typically, the government and NFF came to an 
agreement, and the former then made a proposal for the Parliament on 
the total amount and its distribution. Revenue-increasing and cost- 
reducing support were always major parts of the proposal, of which 
the wet fish price support was distributed through price discrimination, 
favoring raw material for the most labor-intensive frozen fillet produc-
tion. The distribution between fisheries and regions varied over time, 
according to changes in the world market prices, relative costs, species 
composition and regional distribution of caches, with the objective of 
creating jobs and income, particularly in rural areas. Maintaining 
employment in the rural areas was the main policy objective from the 
early 1950s, when the frozen fish processing plants were established, 
and throughout the expansion through the 1960s and 1970s. Raw fish 
used for the more labor-intensive frozen fillet processing industry 
therefore received most of the price support. Despite what has often 
been claimed, the economic support per man-year was higher in the 
Southwest region of Norway than in the North, due to price subsidies 
that favored quantity harvested [22]. 
Fig. 1 demonstrates the total annual government support of the 
Norwegian fishing industries, on sea and land, from 1964 to 2012, 
through the general agreement.3 The lower curve is in nominal terms, 
and the uppermost one is in real (1998) terms. From the commencement 
of support after the general agreement, the support in nominal terms 
stayed more or less the same until the early 1970s, and then started to 
climb, whereas the real value of support fell over the first decade of 
institutionalised support.4 
From 1980 to 1988, the annual support fell more or less continu-
ously, but then climbed and remained relatively high in 1989–1991, the 
three odd years. In real terms, the average annual reduction from 1980 
to 1996 was as high as 24.1%, bringing the support down from 4576 
million NOK to 96.5 million NOK. However, the three odd years in 
particular break the average downward slope. Thus, the major reduction 
of the government support took place in the 1980s. 
Fig. 2 shows the annual support in per cent of the landed value of fish 
and other marine animals, and the shape is much the same as the real 
value curve in Fig. 1. This indicates that the reason for the localized 
1989–1991 hump is on the fish quantitative side more so than on the 
value side. 
Fig. 3 shows the relative quantity of cod (Gadus morhua) and the total 
for all species landed by Norwegian vessels in three periods. The middle 
shows the period of 1989–1991, to the left is the decade 1979–1988, put 
equal to 100, and to the right is the decade 1992–2001. It is noticeable 
that the three odd years from Figs. 1 and 2 are odd also when it comes to 
average catches, especially for cod, as well as for the total. With the great 
importance of the cod fisheries for many communities – especially in 
Northern Norway – the closure of the fishery for coastal vessels in April 
1989, due to serious stock decline, came as a shock. Until then, the 
coastal vessels had operated relatively freely, in contrast to trawlers that 
were first limited by a total quota in 1978 [2]. The great reduction in 
quotas and catches in 1989–91 triggered increased economic support 
from the government, as demonstrated in Figs. 1 and 2. Shortly after 
1990, the cod stock increased rapidly, as did harvests. Since then, in-
dividual and/or group quotas have also limited the coastal vessels’ 
catches and contributed to improved profitability. 
Government support through annual agreements ended in 2004, 
when the Parliament formally dissolved the general agreement. How-
ever, some minor support with social and ecological objectives are 
included in the regular government budget. An example of the former is 
support of arrangements with minimum income and old age pensions for 
fishermen. Support of sealing serves as an example of the latter. The 
fishing industry is to some extent exempted from environmental and 
energy taxes, and this could be considered as support [24]. However, 
certain other national industries and the fishing industries of other Eu-
ropean countries also have similar privileges, and therefore, the industry 
claims that these exemptions are not true subsidies (see Ref. [32]. 
A government-owned bank, The Norwegian Fisheries Bank, estab-
lished in 1921, expanded its mandate and lending capital during the 
1920s and 1930s. This bank played an important role for several decades 
in financing expansion and renewal of the fishing fleet and processing 
plants, until it was shut down in 1997. Lending rates were lower, and 
other conditions better in this bank than in the private banking sector, 
mainly due to government-guaranteed cheaper funding. In some cases, 
the Fisheries Bank was an ad hoc instrument in supporting particular 
fleet programs, such as bigger coastal vessels during the 1950s, fleet 
renewal and debt appreciation in the 1960s and the purse seine buyback 
and scrapping program in the first half of the 1980s. Attractive condi-
tions in the Fisheries Bank often created excess demand for loans. 
Necessary capital rationing took place partially by use of government 
instructions about the annual lending policy and partially by priority 
lists and recommendations created by municipality fisheries committees 
who had good knowledge of the applicants and their projects. In 1992, a 
government-appointed committee on the financing of fishing vessels, 
headed by B.S. Brochmann, advised that the Fisheries Bank should be 
closed and its tasks transferred to the State Business and Rural Devel-
opment Fund (SND), which was done in 1997. Later, the fisheries 
1 This was based on [5]. 
2 The sources of this section are [4]; B.S. Brochmann, personal communica-
tion 23rd December 2019 [6,17,22,25,26]; unless otherwise stated.  
3 Based on accounting figures. 
4 The average exchange rate NOK per USD 1964–2012 was 6.65, with some 
ups and downs – max 8.99 (2001), min 4.94 (1980). Thus, the nominal value of 
the support in the peak year 1980 corresponds to 283.4 million USD. This was 
also the peak year in real value. 
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portfolio was transferred to the government institution Innovation 
Norway (established 2004), and the traditional government support of 
fishing vessels through subsidized loans more or less ended. 
To fully understand the use of fisheries subsidies in a specific 
country, including the outset, rise and decline, it may be necessary to use 
several scientific disciplines, such as political science (institutions), 
history, economics, biology and technology. This is also the case with 
the Norwegian support and the turning point in 1980–81. It is, however, 
outside the scope of this article to investigate thoroughly all the possible 
causes of such changes. The emphasis is on the research presented in 
Brochmann’s work [4,5] and in his media interviews that brought new 
knowledge to policy makers and industry, although it proved provoca-
tive for the latter. 
International agreements of which Norway was a part also spurred 
the abolishment of fishing industry support. The EU worked for a 
reduction of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to intra-union trade, 
including national subsidies, to avoid unfair competition. Norway never 
became a member of the EU. However, the European Economic Area 
(EEA) – established in 1994 between the EU and the three European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) – 
for all practical purposes made these countries parts of the European 
single market with the same basic rules. These rules aim to enable free 
movement of labor, goods, services, and capital within the European 
Single Market, but the agriculture and fisheries policy of the EU was not 
part of the EEA agreement. However, some rules apply, including the 
EEA agreement – which in Article 4.1 of Protocol 9 on trade in fish and 
Fig. 1. Government support of Norwegian fisheries, nominal and real (1998), 1964–2012. Source: Statistics Norway and Directorate of Fisheries.  
Fig. 2. Government support in per cent of ex-vessel value of catch. Source: [43].  
Fig. 3. Relative catches of cod and totals for all species in three periods, with 
1979–1988 equal to 100. Source: Directorate of Fisheries. 
O. Flaaten                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Marine Policy 126 (2021) 104112
4
other marine products states that “Aid granted through State resources 
to the fisheries sector which distorts competition shall be abolished.” 
The EFTA had agreed on similar rules taking effect in 1989. This spurred 
the abolishment first and foremost of the use of price-discriminating 
subsidies favoring the most labor-intensive production of frozen fillets. 
Fish processers in other EFTA countries now had the right to purchase 
raw fish at the same prices as the Norwegian industry, independent of 
the type of processing. The times for supporting fish processing through 
lower input prices in mainly rural areas had ended.5 
3. The chief economist 
Bjørn S. Brochmann, b. 1947, Havøysund, Finnmark, Norway; MA in 
Economics 1973, University of Oslo. Ministry of Fisheries (MF) 
1974–1986 (different positions); except the academic year 1979–1980 
at the Institute of Fisheries (later, the Norwegian College of Fisheries 
Science), University of Tromsø (UiT). In 1986, he left the MF to work for 
the Norwegian oil company Statoil. 
As Head of Economic Affairs at the MF, he was put in charge of the 
ministry’s work on the coming white paper on fisheries development, 
scheduled for 1981. He had previously participated in the work on a 
fisheries long term plan [40]. In December 1980, he gave a talk at an 
internal meeting/seminar for regional fisheries officers and adminis-
trators and presented his analysis from Ref. [5] and preliminary analyses 
for the upcoming white paper. He also made recommendations such as: 
“From an economic point of view it is worse to employ people through 
over-capacity than to pay them just to relax outside their houses and 
enjoy the sun” [18] p. 769) (the author’s translation). The support was 
not just of limited usefulness to increase income in the industry, but it 
was a basic cause of the problem, causing over-capacity and downward 
pressure on the fish stocks. By chance, the fisheries magazine Fiskets 
Gang got hold of and published his talk, and regular newspapers fol-
lowed up, emphasizing in particular the recommendations. Leading 
people in the fishing industry and organizations reacted fiercely, some 
demanding the Minister of Fisheries to sack Brochmann. This claim was 
also raised by a member of parliament (MP) in a discussion in the 
Parliament (Stortinget) in the early spring of 1981. The Minister, how-
ever, declined to do so, although he had to distance himself from some of 
Brochmann’s ideas.6 
Upon preparing his talk, Brochmann had circulated his manuscript 
within a group of key people in the ministry, and even secured the 
Minister’s signature. Despite the public criticism of the Minister and his 
chief economist, the work on the fisheries development paper 
continued, but at a slower pace and without being published. It was not 
until the change of government in September 1981, including a change 
of the MF from a Social Democrat (Eivind Bolle) to a Conservative (Tor 
Listau), that the process resumed. The new Minister expressed internally 
that Brochmann should still be leading the work and should include 
some of his analysis in the upcoming white paper on fisheries develop-
ment. This was presented to the Parliament in Ref. [41] (“On guidelines 
on the fisheries policy”). In the meantime, Brochmann had worked on 
his article for the leading national economics journal Sosialøkonomen 
[4], to reach a bigger professional audience than the university 
department report [5]. 
The work of [4,5] is a dynamic policy and bioeconomic analysis of 
the expected long-term effects of fisheries subsidies within the Norwe-
gian institutional context, using a comparative static approach. As noted 
above, several economists had recommended the use of resource taxes as 
a remedy to bridge the gap between average and marginal revenue at the 
optimal level of fishing effort, but without any success in implementing 
this in actual policies.7 On the contrary, in several countries govern-
ments subsidized their fisheries without really knowing the economic 
and resource consequences of this. [4,5] demonstrate, theoretically, the 
consequences of a subsidy scheme, with an application to Norway where 
the industry, no matter how much or little fish is in the sea, through a 
substantial price subsidy is “guaranteed” an average worker’s salary. 
The sad development of the industry was in line with the theory; 
declining resources and need of more and more government financial 
support. The bioeconomic theoretical foundation is a Gordon-Schaefer 
model, where the fish biomass has quadratic growth and the harvest 
per unit of effort (vessel) is proportional with the biomass. In an 
open-access fishery, the model has a bioeconomic equilibrium where 
biomass decreases and effort increases with the price of fish–cost of 
effort ratio. When policy makers and industry together engender higher 
fish prices and lower costs by use of subsidies, the effort expanded with a 
negative effect on the fish stock. Declining catches followed, and the 
industry spoke to their need for more government support to solve the 
declining income problem. However, [4,5] underlines that the govern-
ment support is the main cause of the problems and not a solution to the 
income problem in the long term. Since then, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), OECD and others have used 
similar models and analytical approaches in their discussions of gov-
ernment support of fisheries (see below). 
It may be difficult to measure the direct policy impacts of theoretical 
and empirical academic research. However [5], report and 1981 article, 
his educational talks for fisheries administrators and his media in-
terviews have been discussed in several media and industry organiza-
tions. This, at least, created awareness of possible long-term negative 
effects of fisheries subsidies. In the white paper, revenue-increasing and 
cost-reducing support, which traditionally were the major part of Nor-
wegian subsidies, were critically discussed in particular [41]. Such 
measures could not solve the long-term economic problems of the fish-
ing industry, nor could they contribute to sustainable jobs or stop the 
ongoing depopulation of coastal rural areas, as was claimed by many 
politicians and fishermen representatives. Brochmann’s ideas were, 
however, gradually accepted [17,41,42]. A couple of years after 
Brochmann’s paper and talks, he by chance met the Director General of 
the Fishermen’s Federation (Jørn A. Krogh, 1948–2015), who com-
plained that Brochmann had created great problems for them. “The 
government negotiating delegation refers to your article and uses it 
constantly as an argument to remove all financial support” [3] pers. 
comm., December 23, 2019). Thus, the inclusion of his ideas in the white 
paper, and to some extent the use of them in policymaking, indicate that 
his message was understood and accepted, at least at the professional 
administrative level within ministries, but only gradually among in-
dustry representatives and the public. 
As demonstrated above, the major part of the Norwegian fisheries 
5 This contrasts the agriculture sector support where Norway is on top, 
together with Iceland, of the OECD Producer support estimate (PSE) list, with 
about 60% as a share of the gross farm receipts (2016–2018). Interesting, two 
other fishing nations, Korea and Japan, follow suit, after Switzerland, with 
around 50%. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/39bfe6f3-en/1/2/1/index. 
html?itemId=/content/publication/39bfe6f3-en&_csp_=51ec64fa22c00b049 
1ec73dc26aa9d45&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book.  
6 Nasjonalbiblioteket (The National library) has digitalised Norwegian 
newspapers, national as well as local. A search on Bjørn Brochmann for 1980 
and 1981 gave tens of hits regarding his papers, talks, interviews and work for 
the Ministry of fisheries. Many was very critical to his work and to the ministry. 
(https://www.nb.no/search?q=bj%C3%B8rn_brochmann&mediatype=aviser 
&fromDate=19800101&toDate=19811201, accessed 7th June 2020). Even in 
Iceland newspapers referred to Brochmann and the fishery subsidy issues in 
Norway (https://timarit.is/?q=bj%C3%B8rn+brochmann&from=01.01.1981 
&to=31.12.1981&publicationId=&sort=&isLongSnippets=false&isBeyginga 
r=false&isAdvanced=false&size=10&page=1, accessed 7th June 2020). 
7 Resource tax and other fishing industry taxes have been discussed in several 
Government papers in Norway, lately in Ref. [44]; but so far the Government 
and the Parliament have declined to tax fisheries more than other industries 
(except for some minor administrative cost recovering fees), arguing that any 
resource rent should remain within the industry. 
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support were abolished during the 1980s, excluding the odd years 1989- 
91, and B.S. Brochmann’s work contributed to this.8 
4. International development of fisheries subsidies rules 
Before the Law of the Sea in the second half of the 1970s made it 
possible for countries to legally establish 200-mile EEZs, there was an 
international race to fish in the oceans globally. Many countries 
expanded their fisheries by government support so as not to lose out 
against their competitors. It is not only fisheries’ objectives that were 
behind the wishes for such an expansion, but also global political rivalry 
issues [12,15], 9 For centuries, Norway had used its near shore waters 
for fishing and sealing, and with the development of motorized vessels, 
this expanded further into the oceans. The development of steam en-
gines, and later diesel engines, in the late 19th century expanded the 
long-distant trawler fleet of Great Brittan and other European countries. 
Throughout the 20th century, this increased the competition for fish 
resources and created conflicts between the active gear trawl and pas-
sive gears, such as long-line and gill-net [26]. The expansion of inter-
national offshore fishing was often spurred on by national subsidies 
[15], and to meet this competition, Norway, during the early- and 
mid-20th century, had government support programs to build larger 
vessels. Globally, conflicts between long-distant fishing fleets and local 
fisheries made countries gradually expand their national territorial 
waters and internal fishing areas. With the development during the 
1970s of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), more and more countries expanded their national waters by 
establishing EEZs. In 1977, Norway established its EEZ (200 nautical 
miles), and from then on, the international competition argument for 
national subsidies dwindled. Despite this, the subsidies increased until 
1980, as Fig. 1 demonstrates. Towards the late-1980s and early 1990s, 
other international development made it necessary to reduce govern-
ment support even further. As noted above, the inclusion of rules for free 
trade of fish and fish products in the EFTA agreement, put into action 
from January 1, 1989, and the EEA from 1994, forbid the use of sub-
sidies that contradict free trade. 
International governmental organizations such as the OECD, the FAO 
and the Word Trade Organization (WTO) have discussed fisheries sub-
sidies with the aim of reducing or restructuring their use, as have several 
international non-governmental organizations. They unanimously ob-
ject to expansion or reintroduction of fisheries subsidies that expand 
capacity and effort.10 
The OECD, with its Committee for Fisheries, has for more than half a 
century discussed economic and management issues with the aim of 
improving fisheries management in member countries, as well as in-
ternational trade in fish and fisheries products [19,28–30,33]. Subsidies, 
usually termed government financial transfers (GFT) within the OECD, 
were discussed and classified, and data were collected from member 
countries. They agreed that not all GFTs are harmful to the fish resources 
and the economy. General services include fisheries research, enforce-
ment, management, enhancement and infrastructure. Most of these 
services are important for ensuring the sustainable use of fish stocks and 
the aquatic ecosystem. However, some member countries wanted to play 
down the emphasis on bad GFTs, expanding fishing capacity and effort, 
thereby increasing the pressure on the fish resources.11 The type of 
subsidy analysis in Refs. [4,5] was deferred to non-official OECD reports 
[19] instead of being integrated in, for example, the [33] (see Part 3 
Government financial transfers and resource sustainability). The orga-
nization has gradually improved its database on fisheries support, and 
made it available online. The Fisheries Support Estimates (FSE) database 
[31,32] is intended to be the best source of information on fisheries 
policies in OECD members and participating non-OECD economies. 
Several researchers have worked for the OECD as consultants or used 
their data for important publications on fisheries subsidies (see e.g. Refs. 
[10,27,36,45,47]; and [37]. 
In 1997, general services amounted to 13% of the value of landings, 
and in 2015, this was down to 9.9%. Support in the form of revenue- 
enhancing and cost-reducing transfers to the sector, mainly considered 
harmful, was 4 and 1.612 per cent of the value of landings in 1997 and 
2015, respectively. Fuel tax concessions in 2015 amounted to 0.713 per 
cent of the value of landings in OECD countries [19,32]. Thus, there has 
been a significant reduction in GFTs in member countries from 1997 to 
2015. 
The FAO, like the OECD, has a long history in discussing fisheries 
subsidies. Its fisheries committee, COFI, has more members than that of 
the OECD, and it takes significant effort and diplomatic work to reach 
unanimous decisions. The strength is the global geographic coverage 
with member states from all continents, both in rich, developed and 
poor, developing countries. Often, international experts have drafted 
technical papers for discussions in COFI and at special meetings. The 
focus has been on sustainable fisheries and oceans, providing safe and 
attractive jobs in the fisheries from the boat to the market. For half a 
century, COFI and the FAO officers have also discussed subsidy issues 
[20]. Between 1959 and 1972, fisheries expanded, and world catches 
increased from about 30 to 60 million tons. Surveys undertaken by the 
FAO revealed that long-distance fleets from Europe, the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, Japan, USA, Cuba, the Republic of Korea and Ghana 
expanded their operations off the North-West and South-West Africa and 
in the tropical oceans, supported by subsidy schemes. Between 1972 and 
1982, the world fish harvest continued to increase, from 60 to 68 million 
tons, and several surveyed stocks deteriorated, except in a few areas. The 
FAO and other international bodies organized conferences on fisheries 
issues, including over-fishing, over-capitalization and subsidies, of 
which London (1946) and Vancouver (1972) are two, as reported in the 
work of [20]. Inadequacies in the management of international fisheries, 
and the negative role of many types of subsidies, stressed in scientific 
fora since the mid-1960s, were finally recognized in most 
inter-governmental fisheries management arenas [13,20]. 
The WTO is particularly interested in possible trade effects of fish-
eries subsidies. It has tried since the commencement of the Doha 
Development Round in 2001 to reach an agreement on prohibiting 
certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing. At the 2017 Ministerial Conference (MC 11 in Buenos 
Aires), ministers decided to conclude the negotiations at the 2019 
Ministerial Conference. However, this failed. The aim is now related to 
the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, where number 
14 is related to seas and oceans: “Conserve and sustainably use the 
oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development …. ” 
8 Some other Norwegian researchers have placed more emphasis on a later 
period: “Whereas the general agreement was criticised and lost its legitimacy 
during the 1980s, it was not until the international trade agreements at the 
beginning of the 1990s (EFTA, later WTO and EEA) that the government sup-
port was cut down and the general agreement finally dissolved.” [16] p. 46 (the 
author’s translation).  
9 Such subsidy-spurred rivalries still exist in some major fishing areas, 
notably in the South of China Sea, where international competition and not the 
Law of the Sea rules [34]. 
10 One initiative by 40 NGOs, including Seas at Risk, in 2018 asked the Eu-
ropean Commission to halt reintroduction of harmful fisheries subsidies https 
://seas-at-risk.org/16-fisheries/914-40-environmental-ngos-ask-european- 
commission-to-halt-reintroduction-of-harmful-fisheries-subsidies.html. 
11 For three years, 1998–2001, this author was Head of the Fisheries Depart-
ment of the OECD and I was stunned to learn how, in particular, some EU 
countries tried to play down the amount of support to their fishing fleets, from 
the national and the EU budget.  
12 For 2015 the amount included comprises “Transfers to individual fishers – 
Budgetary” [32].  
13 By taking the reported fuel tax concessions in some member countries in per 
cent of landings in all OECD countries. 
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Target 14.6 includes specifically the WTO on fisheries subsidies: “By 
2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) and refrain from 
introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and 
effective special and differential treatment for developing and least 
developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Or-
ganization fisheries subsidies negotiation.” 
So why bring subsidy issues into the WTO? As discussed above, 
fisheries subsidies may have effects on production, positive or negative, 
depending on whether resources are biologically underutilized or 
overfished, as well as on the management system at work. When there 
are effects on production, there will usually be effects on trade as well, 
and thus, several WTO countries find it reasonable to discuss such issues 
with the aim of reaching an agreement on what to do. 
The Doha Round has run for nearly twenty years without a conclu-
sion on new trade rules. Globally, some countries probably do not see a 
significant need to conclude, while others do not think it is possible to 
reach a unanimous agreement and have a more laissez faire attitude to 
the process. In such a discussion, is it possible that the WTO can reach an 
agreement on fisheries subsidies? Many experts and policy makers 
believe that subsidies partly contributed to overfishing and trade dis-
tortions, and the WTO negotiations were planned to continue at the 12th 
Ministerial Conference in Nur-Sultan on June 8–11, 2020. Combating 
IUU fishing in particular will benefit national welfare and gains of trade. 
The work of Sakai and colleagues (2019) has the explicit: “aims to re-
view the existing academic literature and discuss the role of academic 
studies in policy-making processes during the negotiation of fisheries 
subsidies” [37] p 440). This is comprehensive on descriptive, theoretical 
and empirical studies, and also discusses the challenges ahead of the 
coming meetings at the WTO. 
5. Conclusion 
The fraction of marine fish stocks fished within biologically sus-
tainable levels exhibited a declining trend, from 90% in 1974 to 67% in 
2015, whereas the fraction of stocks fished at unsustainable levels 
increased from ten per cent in 1974 to 33% in 2015 [14]. Of the sus-
tainable 67% of stocks in 2015, 60% points were at maximum sustain-
able levels and 7% points were under-fished with a potential to expand 
catches. The decline in the number of assessed stocks at maximum 
sustainable levels from 1974 to 2015 did not happen continuously. It 
was even lower at the end of the 1980s, before it rose to 60% in 2015, 
“partly due to increased implementation of management measures” 
[14]. Thus, management matters. According to the FAO, it is unlikely to 
rebuild in the near future the 33% of stocks that are currently overf-
ished, despite the Sustainable Development Target 14.2: “… to restore 
fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce 
maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological charac-
teristics.” [14]. However, the target to “By 2020 prohibit certain forms 
of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing” 
(https://indicators.report/targets/14-6/) may be a necessary step to-
wards restoration of stocks, but management measures may be even 
more important. 
The history of Norwegian government support demonstrates that 
policy changes may take time. The government, industry and public in 
general may have different views on both the long-term goals and on the 
transitional period policy measures [33]. With Parliament elections 
every fourth year, any government obviously will think of the 
re-election possibilities of different ways of combining revenues and 
costs in its budgets. Moreover, if it is a responsible government, it should 
think about long-term effects for economic growth and welfare of its 
policy measures, although expert advisors do not always agree on the 
effects of different policies. Knowledge about, for example, how 
expansive, balanced or deficit budgets affect countries’ economic 
growth, in the short and in the long term, are still discussed among 
economists. 
When working on small theoretical models, it is usually easy to agree 
on what happens in the modelled economy. However, the more and 
bigger the models, to make them closer to the actual economy, the more 
disagreements may appear. The economic and policy analyses of [4,5]; 
of government support of fisheries in Norway, increased the knowledge 
of damaging long-term effects of bad subsidies, among professionals 
and, gradually, among lay people. It is likely that this contributed to the 
significant reduction of the subsidies during the 1980s, a policy impact, 
and that the international agreements the country entered into at the 
end of the 1980s and early 1990s spurred even further reductions in the 
government support of the fishing industry. Maybe an agreement on 
similar issues in international organizations such as the WTO, FAO and 
OECD may spur countries to abolish bad government support that ex-
pands capacity and efforts and contributes to overfishing. 
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